The Role of Incentives in the Organizational Structure: A model of Performance Maximization by Pascual-Ezama, David & Dunfield, Derek
Journal of Business Theory and Practice 
ISSN 2329-2644 
Vol. 2, No. 1, 2014 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/jbtp 
120 
 
Original Paper 
The Role of Incentives in the Organizational Structure: A model 
of Performance Maximization 
David Pascual-Ezama1 and Derek Dunfield2 
1 Department of Financial Economy and Accounting II, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 
Madrid, Spain 
2 Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, MA. 
USA 
* David Pascual-Ezama, david.pascual@ccee.ucm.es 
 
Abstract 
To optimize firm performance, both individual employee and organizational performance must be taken 
into account. In this paper, we combine several theoretical models of individual and organizational 
behavior to propose the Organizational Performance Maximization Model (OPMM), in which 
individual and corporate performance maximization are combined. 
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1. Introduction 
Living in a post-economic crisis world, it has become ever more crucial for firms to optimize their 
performance. Performance maximization has typically been considered on two very different scales: A 
corporate framework, where an organization model typically consisting of activities such as 
coordination, planning, and supervision is implemented to maximize achievement of firm goals, or an 
individual framework, where companies focus on individual incentives to motivate worker productivity. 
While firms have always tried to maximize worker performance, the effects of incentives and 
monitoring, either separate or simultaneous, have only recently been studied empirically. Both types of 
influence have surprising, non-intuitive results, which tend to be highly dependent on the type of tasks 
being completed, the type of workers, as well as the type corporate organization. By combining several 
theoretical models of individual and organizational behavior, here we propose the Organizational 
Performance Maximization Model (OPMM) which combines both a corporate framework and an 
individual behavioral frameworks to maximize firm performance overall. 
 
2. An Organization-Workers Approach 
One of the main challenges for an organization is choosing how to design an ideal corporate framework 
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to maximize workers’ performance. Theoretically, the motivation and effort of volunteers in non-profit 
organizations should be as high as possible, with dishonest behavior non-existent. If we accept that 
volunteers in non-profit organizations have roles similar to workers in regular firms, a non-profit 
framework is the de-facto corporate standard to maximize workers’ performance. This corporate 
framework is based on a simple organizational model with four different phases (Figure 1). 
Implementation is the first phase, where volunteer roles are supervised and determined by the 
organization. After the implementation phase, volunteers and organizations undergo separate analysis 
phases, with volunteers undertaking personal evaluations and organizations evaluating overall 
performance. If the conclusions of the analysis are similar, volunteer satisfaction will be good and 
future performance will improve.  
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Figure 1. Non Profit Organizations Organizational Model 
 (Pascual-Ezama et al., 2010) 
 
While the non-profit corporate framework may be theoretically sound for motivated volunteers, 
workers in regular firms may not fit the volunteer mold perfectly. For example, unlike volunteers, 
regular workers are paid for their time, yet (without surprise) a worker’s salary guarantees neither 
motivation nor correct performance. As such, for real firms, this idealized corporate framework is not 
complete. Using a performance maximization model, we explore how real worker motivation can be 
influenced by both corporate supervision as well as other incentives (Figure 2). 
Organization
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Figure 2. Profit Organizations Organizational Model 
 
3. An Incentives-Monitoring Approach 
Due to inefficiencies in the labor market, it is common practice for firms to employ both incentive 
systems as well as monitoring systems to motivate workers and assure adequate performance. 
According to Ariely et al, 2009, the expectation that increasing performance-contingent incentives will 
improve performance rests on two subsidiary assumptions: (1) that increasing performance-contingent 
incentives will lead to greater motivation and effort and (2) that this increase in motivation and effort 
will result in improved performance. Even if these assumptions hold, however, firms must still combat 
other types sub-optimal behavior, such as dishonesty. To account for dishonesty in the workplace and 
its effect on effort and output, firms may employ a monitoring system, such as direct supervision. To be 
effective, individual performance models must take into account all these points: incentives, monitoring, 
deception, motivation, effort, and ultimately performance (Figure 3). 
While dishonest behavior may seem less likely than a worker’s lack of motivation, it is in fact very 
common, especially for high executives. Executives admit taking real economic actions to meet 
earnings projections (Granham et al. 2005): 80% would decrease spending on R&D, advertising and 
maintenance; 55% would delay a start of a new project; 40% would book revenues now rather than 
next quarter; 39% would provide incentives for customers to buy more; 28% draw down on reserves 
previously set aside; and 8% alter accounting assumptions. Although the relationship between the 
incentives and supervision seems intuitive (more effort should result in better performance and 
increased monitoring should result in more effort) empirical research shows that our intuitions are 
rarely correct.  
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Figure 3. Performance Maximization Model (PMM) 
 
According to standard economic reasoning, an increase in the financial incentives provided for an 
activity will improve performance. However, there are some notable exceptions. Gneezy and Rustichini, 
(2000), show that people who are unpaid tend to exert greater effort than those paid only a small 
amount. Alternatively, Ariely et al. (2009), demonstrate that when incentives are too high, people may 
“choke under pressure,” resulting in very bad performance. In the first case, motivation decreased with 
small incentives compared to a non-incentive condition, causing both effort and performance to 
decrease as well. In the second case, incentives caused both high motivation and effort, but 
performance was bad. While these are only two examples, they illustrate how incentives can effect 
motivation, effort and performance in unexpected ways, making it difficult to define a clear relationship 
between them. 
Much like incentives, the main effects of supervision on effort can also be non-intuitive. Supervision is 
often necessary to both guarantee good performance and to inhibit dishonest behavior. In the academic 
literature, however, it is unclear what effect monitoring has on motivation and effort. Some researchers, 
such as Falk and Kosfeld (2006), have suggested that close supervision of workers might undermine 
intrinsic motivation. Whereas, other authors like Ariely et al (2008) have recently proposed that the 
way in which monitoring is framed crucially influences its effect on motivation. Regardless of which 
approach is correct, however, supervision is effective at reducing dishonest behavior (Pascual-Ezama et 
al, 2013). Unfortunately, because of its expense, many firms chose to rely solely on economic or social 
incentives, which (without supervision) can actually increase deception in the workplace 
(Pascual-Ezama et al. 2013). 
The results of these empirical studies, among others, point to the necessity of developing an 
organizational model that captures all the connections between incentives and monitoring and their 
effects on workers performance. This combined model would provide a deeper understanding about 
how firms can integrate the realities of individual behavioral drivers into their corporate framework. 
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4. Organizational Performance Maximization Model 
Based on the conclusions of the literature and combining previous theoretical models of individual and 
organizational behavior, our objective is to propose a new model, the Organizational Performance 
Maximization Model (OPMM, Figure 4). The OPMM combines the Organizational Model (Figure 2) 
with a Performance Maximization Model (Figure 3), allowing us to account for both individual and 
corporate performance to maximize firm performance overall. 
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Figure 4. Organizational Performance Maximization Model (OPMM) 
 
5. Conclusions 
The OPMM serves as both a model of the complexities of performance in the workplace, as well as a 
template for further academic research investigating the correlations between individual performance 
and corporate structure. Because our intuitions about the effects of incentives and supervision on 
performance are often incorrect, it is imperative that such a model exists to allow firms to make better 
decisions and ultimately improve both worker efficiency as well as corporate decision-making.  
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